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COPYRIGHT-CO-OWNERS
T Em rights and obligations of co-owners inter se as well
as in relation, jointly and severally, to their assigns
and licensees, is a current problem in copyright.'
Co-ownership of copyright exists when there are two or
more undivided interests in the copyright or the subject mat-
ter thereof. Although in the cases the terms joint owner,
joint tenant, co-owner and co-tenant are variously used, the
interest is considered a tenancy in common 2 rather than a
joint tenancy 3 and there is no survivorship right.4
As stated in Halsbury5 , the English rule seems to be
that: "Joint authors are in the position of tenants in common
and not of joint tenants." Powell v. ftead ( is cited for this
' Recent cases dealing with the problem in some or more of its phases are:
Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d) 266; same, 140 F. (2d)
268; same, 140 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc.,
137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943); Crosney v. Edward Small Productions,
52 F. Supp. 559 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Brown v. Republic Productions, 156
P. (2d) 40; same, 156 P. (2d) 42 (Cal. App. 1945).
2Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921),
cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923) ; Klein v. Beach, 232 Fed. 240 (S. D. N. Y.
1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 108 (C. C. A. 25, 1917) ; Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain
Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (E. D. Wis. 1941); Brown v. Republic Productions,
156 P. (2d) 40; same, 156 P. (2d) 42 (Cal. App. 1945); Carter v. Bailey,
64 Me. 458 (1874); Dunham v. Indianapolis & St L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 44,
No. 4151 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876) (patent case); see Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859, 865 (S. D. N. Y. 1942),
aff'd, 140 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Lauri v. Renad, [1892] 3 Chan.
402, 412-413; AMDUn, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACiCE (1936) 616; CoPiNGE_,
LAW OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 191; Fox, CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT
(1944) 256; 7 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENTGLAND (2d ed. 1932) § 858; HOWELL,
THE COPYRIGHT LAW (1942) 51; WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 547.
3Nowadays the law favors tenancy in common rather than joint tenancy.
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 421.
Some states have statutes requiring that the interest be construed a tenancy
in common unless the instrument of conveyance or devise states expressly that
it is to be joint, e.g., NEW YoRK REAL PROPERTY LAW § 66. This New York
statute has been interpreted as applying to personalty as well as realty. Page
v. Hoxie, 104 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939).
4 Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (E. D. Wis. 1941);
see Lauri v. Renad, [18921 3 Chan. 402, 412-413; COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT
(7th ed. 1936) 191; SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1939) 170. But see
Marzials v. Gibbons, 30 L. T. 666, 667 (Chan. 1874) ; Levy v. Rutley, L. K. 6
C. P. 523, 531 (1871). In the Stuff case, supra, the court found nothing to
show a joint estate or words of survivorship in the copyright notice, which was
in the names of two people, or in the copyright certificate. If there had been
such indicia, the result might have been different
5 Op. cit. sup-ra note 2.
612 Ch. D. 686 (1879).
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proposition. There, Sir George Jessel, M. R., stated:
In this case you have two assignees, two ladies who became
assignees of this opera, or the right of representing it at different
times, and therefore they were strictly tenants in common or part-
owners of the right of representation, ... 7
Obviously, this dictum was a determination based on the
absence of the joint tenancy requirement of unity of time,8
and was not an absolute finding in favor of a tenancy in com-
mon in copyright co-ownership cases. Yet the lower court in
the later case of Lauri v. Renad 9 decided the matter had been
foreclosed.
OWNERSHIP IN COMMON
Co-ownership of copyright or literary property can arise
in the following ways and with legal and equitable interests:
(1) From the production. by two or more authors of a
joint work. We have such a joint work not only when there
is a pre-existing common design and a fused finished prod-
uct,1" but when it is intended that each of independently
created and separable contributions be "1... enjoyed and per-
formed together; unlike the parts of a 'composite work', each
of which is intended to be used separately, and whose only
unity is that they are bound together." 11 Concerted action
in production plus interdependence of finished product, or
mere purpose of the authors, either can be determinative of
a joint work.
7Id. at 689.
8 A joint tenancy requires four unities, i.e., unity of interest, title, time
and possession. This means that the interest must be the same and equal,
accrue by the same conveyance or have a common inception, commence at the
same time, and be held by undivided possession. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(3d ed. 1939) § 418.9 See Lauri v. Renad, [1892] 3 Chan. 402, 412-413.
10 Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); see Kupferman,
Renewal of Copyright-Section 23 of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1944) 44
COL. L. REv. 712, 732.
It might be well here to cite the lower court opinion in the Maurel case,
220 Fed. 195 (S. D. N. Y. 1915), as Learned Hand, J., is fond of his opinion
there. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140
F. (2d) 266, 267 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
11 See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140
F. (2d) 266, 267 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). Cf. COPYRIGHT ACT, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo.
V, c. 46, § 16(3) : "For the purposes of this Act, 'a work of joint authorship'
means a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which
the contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution of the other
author or authors."
[ VOL. 19
1945 1] COPYRIGHT-CO-OWNERS
A composite work,12 e.g., a periodical or a cyclopedia,
contains distinguishable portions, but may be copyrighted
separately or in toto. The authors of the portions do not
have a moiety of the whole, but only rights solely in their
individual works; there is no ownership in common.
There is no ownership in common where one person orig-
inates the idea and the other embodies it. 13  The one who
gives it concrete written form is the sole owner.14  Similarly,
there is no ownership in common in the whole for the person
who suggests 'r or makes slight changes in someone else's
work.116
Difficulties sometimes arise, where statutory copyright
is involved, on the question of co-ownership when one who
may not be an author or co-author, is given credit to that
effect on the published work or on the certificate of copyright
registration. It has been held that if one gives another
authorship credit on the published work, he may be estopped
from later denying the other's interest.'7 It has also been
held that certificates of copyright registration,'" for works
12 See Harris v. Coca-Cola Co., 73 F. (2d) 370, 371 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934),
cert. denied, 294 U. S. 709 (1935); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry
Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d) 266, 267; same, 140 F. (2d) 268, 269 (C. C. A.
2d, 1944).
13 Tate v. Thomas, (1921] 1 Ch. D. 503; Bagge v. Miller, Mac G. Cop.
Cas. (191-23) 179 (Ch. D. 1920); see Tate v. Fullbrook, [1908] 1 K. B.
821, 826 (C. A.); Fox, op. cit. sutpra note 2, at 252; 7 HALSBURY, loc. cit. supra
note 2.
14 Of course, the originator of the idea may at the same time be employing
the author, and therefore, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,
entitled to authorship and ownership by virtue of being " .... an employer...
for hire." 35 STAT. 1070 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 62 (1940). Von Tilzer v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); see HOWELL.
op. cit. supra note 2, at 52.
15 Marx v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 204 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
16 Levy v. Rutley, L. R. 6 C. P. 523 (1871) ; see 7 HALSBURY, loc. cit. supra
note 2. But see G. Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia Gramophone Co., 258 Fed. 72,
75 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), appeal dismissed, 263 Fed. 354 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920).
Cf. Maurel v. Smith, 220 Fed. 195, 199 (D. C. N. Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 Fed. 211
(C. C. A. 2d, 1921). These "accessions" are said to adhere to the original
work and become the property of the owner thereof. Keene v. Wheatley, 14
Fed. Cas. 180, No. 7, 644 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1861) ; see AMDUR, Op. Cit. pra
note 2, at 618. If the person making the changes collaborates on such changes
with the author of the original, he may possibly be considered a joint owner.
See Levy v. Rutley, supra, at 529, 530; cf. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d) 266, 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
17 See Kupferman, supra note 10, at 731 and cases cited therein at note 114.
18 Copyright under the modern act is secured by publication plus notice
and nothing further is required. 35 STAT. 1070 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 9 (1940) ;
see Washingtonian Publishing Co.. Inc. v. Pearson, 306 U. S. 30, 37 (1939),
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copyrighted after July 1st, 1909,19 are prima faoie evidence
of the facts stated therein.20  Recently, the question was
presented as to which of these two rules would take prece-
dence. Plaintiff's assignee registered a song for copyright
claiming exclusive authorship, at the same time filing the
necessary printed copies of the composition, recognizing
thereon another as a co-author. The district court gave the
copyright certificate its evidentiary weight and held that this
was not overcome by the admission on the printed copy. The
circuit court 21 affirmed, not being persuaded that the lower
court finding was "clearly wrong".
(2) From the inheritance by two or more persons, either
by will or intestate succession, of undivided shares in a copy-
right or in unpublished literary property owned by the de-
cedent.
(3) From the succession of spouse and children or next
of kin to the renewal right as provided for in Sections 23 and
24 of the Copyright Act of 1909.22 If the author does not
survive to apply for renewal in the twenty-eighth year of the
statutory copyright, then his widow or children may apply,
rehearing denied, 306 U. S. 668 (1939). However, no action may be main-
tamined for infringement until the work has been registered. 38 STAT. 311
(1915), 17 U. S. C. § 12 (1940).
19 Before the passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, the certificate had no
such effect. Bosselman v. Richardson, 174 Fed. 622 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909);
Saake v. Lederer, 174 Fed. 135 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909); see Jerry Vogel Music
Co. v. Forster Music Publisher, 147 F. (2d) 614, 615 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
20 See note 17 supra.
Compare the following provision from the English Act: "if a name pur-
porting to be that of the author of the work is printed or otherwise indicated
thereon in the usual manner, the person whose name is so printed or indicated
shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be the author of the
work"; COPYRIGHT AcT, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 46, § 6(3) (a). In Bagge v.
Miller it was held that the facts of the case negatived this statutory presump-
tion. Mac G. Cop. Cas. (1917-23) 179 (Ch. D. 1920).
21 Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Forster Music Publisher, 147 F. (2d) 614
(C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
This case also held, construing the "Dead Man Statute" [N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 347], that, when one of the purported co-authors is dead and no testimony
is offered on behalf of the deceased with reference to his transactions or com-
munications with the other, the testimony of the living party as to communica-
tions or transactions between them is not admissible. The registration certifi-
cate was not considered to be testimony on behalf of the deceased as to the
transaction.
2235 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §23 (Supp. 1943), 17 U. S. C. §24
(1940).
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taking as tenants in common.23  In the event of the non-
existence of the other applicants provided for, the next of
kin as a class may secure the renewal. 24
(4) From the assignment of an undivided portion of the
entire copyright or one of the statutory divisions thereof.25
The assignee must receive an undivided share, no matter how
small, of a whole right. Receiving less is a license and not
an assignment.2 6
The interest of the co-owner can be equitable.2 7  This
may occur when the court finds a constructive trust as in the
case where a co-owner copyrights in his own name either with
permission 28 or in an effort to derogate from the rights of
the other co-tenant,29 or when one co-author renews and the
court finds he holds the legal title for the benefit of himself
and his co-author or the latter's successors in interest.30 In
23 See Kupferman, Renewal of Copyright-Section 23 of the Copyright
Act of 1909 (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 712, 717. The Regulations of the Copy-
right Office place them all in one category. C. II, tit. 37, C. F. R. § 201.24(2).
24 Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921);
same, 290 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923).
25 A right to royalties does not make you a co-owner. An author who
transfers his copyright subject to royalties based on a percentage of the income
from the copyright retains no right in the copyright itself. Rude v. Wescott,
130 U. S. 152 (1889) (patent case) ; Stringfield v. Warner Brothers Pictures,
Inc., 51 F. Supp. 746 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Krieger v. McFadden Publications,
43 F. Supp. 170 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Ehrlich v. Mills, Inc., 215 App. Div.
116, 213 N. Y. Supp. 395 (1st Dep't 1926), aff'd without opinion, 248 N. Y.
598, 162 N. E. 539 (1928). However, the copyright may be subject to a lien
in the nature of an equitable servitude where the author would otherwise be
deprived of even his right to royalties. In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co.,
48 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
26 Egner v. Schirmer Music Co., 139 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943),
cert. denied, 322 U. S. 730 (1944); Public Ledger v. New York Times, 275
Fed. 562 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), aff0d per curiam, 279 Fed. 747 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922), cert. denied. 258 U. S. 627 (1922) ; New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co.,
220 Fed. 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); see Goldsmith v. Comm'r of Internal Reve-
nue, 143 F. (2d) 446, 467 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; Widenski v. Shapiro, Bernstein
& Co., 147 F. (2d) 909, 910 (C. C. A. 1st, 1945); cf. XII-2 Cums. BULL. 134(1933).
27 See Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909, 914 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923); Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 42 F. Supp. 859, 865 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 140
F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).2 8 See Quinn-Brown Pub. Corp. v. Chilton Co., 15 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.
D. N. Y. 1936).
29 Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); cf. Bisel v. Ladner,
1 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 3d, 1924).
30 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d)
266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp.
191 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1943).
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the renewal co-ownership case, the second circuit has raised
but left unanswered the question of whether the second in-
terest is legal or equitable where the application makes it
obvious that there are co-authors. 3 '
LICENSE BY A Co-OWNER
The uniform American rule is that one co-owner can
grant a license for the use of the work by a third party
without the consent of the remaining co-owners.3 2  He can
also use the work himself,83 and the other co-owners may not
31 In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.
(2d) 268, it was said: ". . . some doubt may be raised whether the legal title
does not run to both authors jointly, when as in this case, it appears on the
very face of the application that there are two [the renewal application named
his co-author as having 'written' the song and stated that he had 'composed' it]
. . . It is not necessary to decide the point as will appear; but for argument
we will assume that, when, as here, one of the joint authors asks for and gets
the renewal in his own name, the legal right goes to him alone, and the other
author's interest is equitable." 140 F. (2d) at 269.
32 Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Piantadosi
v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943); Klein v. Beach, 232
Fed. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 108 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); Talbot
v. Quaker-State Oil Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939)
(patent); Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th,
1901) (patent); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling & S.
Co., 108 Fed. 77 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901) (patent); Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Miller, 61 Fed. 401 (C. C. D. Del. 1894) (patent); Dunham v. Indianapolis &
St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 44, No. 4151 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876) (patent);
Clum v. Brewer, 5 Fed. Cas. 1097, No. 2909 (C. C. D. Mass. 1855) (patent);
Brown v. Republic Productions, 156 P. (2d) 40; same, 156 P. (2d) 42 (Cal.
App. 1945); Nillson v. Lawrence, 148 App. Div. 678, 133 N. Y. Supp. 293
(1st Dep't 1912); Herbert v. Fields, 152 N. Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1915); see Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp.. 273 Fed. 909, 914 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923) ; Crosney v. Edward Small Pro-
ductions, 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Rainbow Rubber Co. v.
Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Md, 1937) (patent) ; First Security
Trust Co. v. Mitchell, 294 Mass. 468, 472, 2 N. E. (2d) 196, 197 (1936)
(patent) ; Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 88, 188 N. E.
163, 167 (1933); De Witt v. Elmira Nobles Mfg. Co., 66 N. Y. 459, 462
(1876) (patent) ; AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1936) 834; BALL,
LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY (1944) 587-588; ELLIS, PATENT
ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSE (2d ed. 1943) § 473, p. 512; WmL, COPYRIGHT LAW
(1917) 547.
33 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d)
266; same, 140 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) ; Drake v. Hall, 220 Fed. 905
(C. C. A. 7th, 1914), rehearing denied (1915) (patent) ; Blackledge v. Weir
& Craig Mfg. Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) (patent); Von Tilzer v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Lalance &
Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling & S. Co., 108 Fed. 77 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1901) (patent); Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697 (C. C. D.
N. J. 1887) (patent); Clum v. Brewer, 5 Fed. Cas. 1097, No. 2909 (C. C. D.
Mass. 1855) (patent) ; Brown v. Republic Productions, 156 P. (2d) 40; same,
156 P. (2d) 42 (Cal. App. 1945); Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458 (1874).; Nillson
v. Lawrence, 148 App. Div. 678, 133 N. Y. Supp. 293 (1st Dept 1912); see
[ VOL. 19
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bring infringement actions against him 34 or his licensees 31
for such use. However, by contract, the co-owners may vary
these rights inter se,36 although, of course, the rights of a
licensee without notice of such an arrangement cannot be
effected.37
The English rule is contra, and one co-owner cannot
Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S. D. N. Y.
1942) ; Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Md.
1937) (patent); Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4151
at 45 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876) (patent) ; First Security Trust Co. v. Mitchell,
294 Mass. 468, 472, 2 N. E. (2d) 196, 197 (1936) (patent); De Witt v. Elmira
Nobles Mfg. Co., 66 N. Y. 459, 462 (1876) (patent); ELLIS, op. Cit. supra
note 32, at § 171, p. 194; FROHLICH AND SCHWARTZ, THE LAW OF MOTION
PiciuPEs (1918) 41; WEIL, loc. cit. szpra note 32. Cf. Osborn v. Schenck,
83 N. Y. 201 (1880) (personalty).
34 Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d) 266; same, 140
F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National
Enameling & S. Co., 108 Fed. 77 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901) (patent); Aspin-
wall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697 (C. C. D. N. J. 1887) (patent); see
Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Md.
1937) (patent); Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4151
at 45 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876) (patent). Contra: Pitts v. Hall, 19 Fed. Cas.
758, No. 11,193 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1854).
The fact that a co-owner cannot be sued for infringement does not pre-
clude other theories of recovery from being utilized. See discussion of Ac-
COUNTING TO A CO-OWNER, infra,
3 5Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Piantadosi
v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; Talbot v. Quaker-State
Oil Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (patent); Dunham v.
Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 44, No. 4151 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876)
(patent) ; Brown v. Republic Productions, 156 P. (2d) 40; same, 156 P. (2d)
42 (Cal. App. 1945) ; see Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F. Supp.
559, 561 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20
F. Supp. 913, 915 (D. Md. 1937) (patent); WALKER, PATENTS (Dellar's ed.
1937) § 364. But see note 70, infra; De Witt v. Elmira Nobles Mfg. Co.,
66 N. Y. 459, 462 (1876) (patent).
36 Talbot v. Quaker-State Oil Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939) (patent); Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling & S.
Co., 108 Fed. 77 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901) (patent); Gould v. Banks, 8 Wend.
562 (N. Y. 1832) ; see Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620, 621 (C. C. A. 9th,
1944) : Cohan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 39 F. (2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A.
2d, 1930); Clum v. Brewer, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2909 at 1103 (C. C. D. Mass.
1855) (patent) ; Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 463 (1874) ; De Witt v. Elmira
Nobles Mfg. Co., 66 N. Y. 459, 462 (1876); Nillson v. Lawrence, 148 App.
Div. 678, 680, 133 N. Y. Supp. 293, 295 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1912) ; Herbert
v. Fields, 152 N. Y. Supp. 487, 490 (Sup. Ct N. Y. Co. 1915) ; FROHLICH AND
SCHWARTZ, loc. cit. supra note 33; WEIL, op. cit. supra note 32, at 167.
37 Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); Talbot v.
Quaker-State Oil Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) (patent).
But see Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F. Supp. 559, 561 (S. D.
N. Y. 1942).
1945 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
grant a license 38 nor use the work himself 39 without the
assent of the other co-owners. If there is such use, both he 40
and his licensee 41 can be sued by any co-owner or co-owners
for infringement. However, recovery in such a suit is limited
to that portion of the damages to which complainant's in-
dividual interest entitles him.4
The conflicting rules on this point stem from a different
philosophical approach.
In the British view, if the rule were otherwise, "... a
part owner would be at the mercy of his co-owners, each of
whom, and they might be any number, might issue as many,
as large, and as cheap editions as he chose, thus completely
ruining the value of the copyright." 43 They find it more
rational to allow each co-owner to act only in regard to his
own share.44
In this country, the contrary view has for its basis a
diametrically opposed rationale:
* * * if none be allowed to enjoy his legal interest without the
consent of all, then one, by withholding his consent, might practic-
ally destroy the value of the whole use.45
Scylla and Charybdis must have been co-owners.
38 Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879) ; see COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHT
(7th ed. 1936) 191; Fox, CANADIAN LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1944) 256; HALS-
BURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND (2d ed. 1932) § 858.
39 Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., [1916] 2 K. B. 325 (1915).
40 Ibid.; COPINGER, op. cit. supra note 38, at 191-192.
41 Powell v. Head, supra note 38.
42 Ibid.; COPINGERZ, 10c. cit. supra note 38. In a footnote thereto, Copinger
has the following statement: "Quaere, whether he could not recover the full
amount of damages, subject to a liability to account to his co-authors."
43 "In my opinion, the old common law rule as to the right of a co-owner
to use the common property has no application to such a property as a copy-
right. It seems to me that a sole right of reproducing, though divisible as to
title, must be indivisible as to exercise." Cescinsky v. George Routledge &
Sons, Ltd., [1916] 2 K. B. 325, 330 (1915).
Another basis, a purely technical one, is that the Interpretation Section of
the English Copyright Act states that the singular includes the plural, so if the
consent of the owner is needed, mutatis mutandis, the consent of the co-owners
is needed. Ibid.; Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879).
44 Powell v. Head, supra, at 688-689; SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT (2d
ed. 1939) 165.
45 Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 463 (1874). Accord, Dunham v. Indian-
apolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. 44, No. 4151 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1876)
(patent) ; cf. Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923), where one of the bases of the court's
determination that one of the next of kin could renew for the benefit of all,
was the injustice if one refused to sign or could not be located.
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ACCOUNTING TO A CO-OWNER
Accepting the preceding observations to the effect that
one co-owner can use the subject matter of the common copy-
right ownership or license others to use it, all without the
consent of the other co-owners, the question arises as to the
interest of the co-owners inter se in the proceeds from such
use or license. This matter seemed early settled with a
laissez-faire solution. Each co-owner was allowed to retain
his own profit from the use of the copyright and his income
from licenses without accounting therefor, although not
without speculative statements about what the proper rule
should be. More recently there have been cases taking the
opposite view. An examination of the authorities 4 will
reveal that the matter can be reopened for determination.
The patent law had first drawn a distinction between a
co-owner who himself engaged in business making a profit
out of the patent, and one who merely licensed the patent.
In the latter situation it was considered proper for the co-
owners to share, while in the former it was thought inequi-
table for those who risked no losses and supplied no capital
46 Cases for an accounting: Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211 (C. C. A. 2d,
1921); Klein v. Beach, 232 Fed. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 103
(C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 53 F. Supp. 191
(S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F. Supp. 559
(S. D. N. Y. 1942); see Pusey & Jones Co. v. Miller, 61 Fed. 401 (C. C. D.
Del. 1894) (patent); Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill, 32 Fed. 697 (C. C. D. N. J.
1887) (patent); Kirke La Shelle v. Armstrong Co., 263 N. Y. 79, 88, 188
N. E. 163, 167 (1933); Brown v. Republic Productions, 156 P. (2d) 40, 41;
same, 156 P. (2d) 42, 43 (Cal. App. 1945) ; cf. Cohan v. Comm'r of Internal
Revenue, 39 F. (2d) 540, 543 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
, Cases against an accounting: Drake v. Hall, 220 Fed. 905 (C. C. A. 7th,
1914), rehearing denied (1915) (patent); Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg.
Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901) (patent); Carter v. Bailey, 64 Maine
458 (1874); see Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909, 914 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1921), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 758 (1923); Rainbow Rubber Co. v.
Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913 (D. C. D. Md. 1937) (patent); Dunham v.
Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4151 at 45 (C. C. N. D. Ill.
1876) (patent); First Security Trust Co v. Mitchell, 294 Mass. 468, 472,
2 N. E. (2d) 196, 197 (1936) (patent); ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS AND
LICENSES (2d ed. 1943) § 473, p. 512, § 171, p. 194; FROHLICH AND SCHWARTZ,
LAW OF MOTION PICTURES (1918) 41; WALKER, PATENTS (Dellar's ed. 1937)
§§344, 363; WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 547.
In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d)
266 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), the court specifically left the question open: "This
appeal does not raise the question whether each might call the other to an
accounting, bringing his own profits into hotchpot." Id. at 268.
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to share in the proceeds of the enterprising co-owner. 7 The
Blackledge case determined that there was no basis for the
distinction for each could use the invention and individual
initiative would return to each the "fruits of his endeavors"
and with no accountability whatsoever.4 8  This seems to be
the current rule in patent law.49  While in this field, the
patent law is considered akin to copyright law,5 0 there have
been copyright cases granting an accounting without examin-
ing the applicable patent law.
A frequent objection by co-owners seeking an accounting
is that the other co-tenant has so used or licensed the use of
the subject matter as to cause the destruction thereof.5 ' This
complaint occurs largely in cases where a motion picture is
created, the idea being that mass showings will surfeit the
public taste for that subject matter. Although there is au-
thority for its acceptance, this objection has been rejected, 5 2
47 See Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co., 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4151 at 45
(C. C. N. D. III. 1876).
48 Blackledge v. Weir & Craig Mfg. Co., 108 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 7th, 1901).
49 See ELLIs, loc. cit. supra note 46; WALKER, loc. cit. szapra note 46.
50 Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943); see
Silverman v. Sunrise Pictures Corp., 273 Fed. 909, 910, 914, cert. denied, 262
U. S. 758 (1923); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,
42 F. Supp. 859, 865 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), aff'd, 140 F. (2d) 266 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944). Accord, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U. S. 390
(1940). But cf. Widenski v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 147 F. (2d) 909 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1945).
5' The general rule of joint ownership is that one co-tenant may not so
use the subject matter of the tenancy as to cause its destruction. See Osborn
v. Schenck, 83 N. Y. 201, 204 (1880). Similarly, there cannot be an ouster of
a co-tenant or other denial of rights. See In re Limberg's Estate, 281 N. Y.
463, 465, 24 N. E. (2d) 127, 128 (1931).
52 Brown v. Republic Productions, 156 P. (2d) 40; same, 156 P. (2d) 42
(Cal. App. 1945) ; Herbert v. Fields, 152 N. Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co.
1915); see AMDnU, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1936) 617, 834; cf., Klein
v. Beach, 232 Fed. 240, 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 108 (C. C. A.
2d, 1917). Contra: Crosney v. Edward Small Productions, 52 F. Supp. 559
(S. D. N. Y. 1942), discussed elsewhere infra; cf. Manners v. Morosco, 252
U. S. 317 (1920); Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N. Y. Supp. 633, 164 App. Div. 231
(1st Dep't 1914).
In Manners v. Morosco, it was held that, when stage rights have been
granted, the owner of the reserved rights, in the absence of a contract per-
mitting it [Macloon v. Vitagraph, Inc., 30 F. (2d) 634 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929)1,
cannot use them to the detriment of the granted stage rights and therefore
cannot make a motion picture, quoting Judge Hough's statement in Harper
Bros. v. Klawu [232 Fed. 609 at 613 (S. D. N. Y. 1916)]: "Admittedly, if
Harper Bros .... permitted photoplays of Ben Hur to infest the country, the
market f or the spoken play would be greatly impaired, if not destroyed." 252
U. S. at 327. It is submitted that today the contrary is true. The motion
picture is good publicity stimulating public desire for the play.
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on the ground that you cannot analogize a case of physical
destruction to an incorporeal entity. Besides, experience has
shown that motion pictures are many times remade and with
different casts, depending, of course, on the public's whim
and fancy.5 3
There would be no point in considering the question of
the destruction of the copyright or literary property unless
the rule were established that there could be no accounting
in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.
In Maurel v. Smith, it was said:
Where two or more persons have a common interest in a prop-
erty, equity will not allow one to appropriate it exclusively to him-
self or to impair its worth as to others. The settlement of rights
between joint tenants or joint owners of property is the subject mat-
ter of equity jurisdiction, and we think that such rights are involved
in this litigation. 4
The Maurel case was not the usual co-ownership situ-
ation. There a co-author had taken the copyright in his own
name and was seeking to profit therefrom. The court de-
clared that the legal title was held in trust for the omitted
co-author and granted an accounting for the appropriate co-
owner's share.55 Obviously, the complainant there had no
other recourse; with the legal title in another's name, she
could not have gathered "fruit" on her own initiative.5
In Klein v. Beach,5 plaintiff, a dramatist, at the request
of a producer, dramatized defendant's novel, the two, having
a contract between them to share royalties on the play, then
granting the right to the producer to present it upon the
stage. The rights reverted to the two because the play was
not produced a sufficient number of times. Thereafter, the
5 In their own self-interest and in order to prevent cheap competitive
versions, motion picture companies generally seek to acquire all rights out-
standing. See KUPFERMAN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 726.
54 See Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211, 216 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921). Cited for
this statement was a case which involved evident fraud and breach of a fidu-
ciary relationship, Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616 (U. S. 1874).
55 SHArrER, loc. cit. supra note 44, states that an omitted co-author will
share in profits.
58 Compare the situation in Meinhard v. Salnon [249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E.
545 (1928)], where the managing co-adventurer took advantage of his position
to reap a business reward of which his joint adventurer had no knowledge and
the court imposed a constructive trust.
57 232 Fed. 240 (S. D. N. Y. 1916), aff'd, 239 Fed. 108 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
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defendant Beach, author of the novel, gave permission to
make a movie. After dismissing the action against the defen-
dant motion picture company, the court stated there was a
duty to account to one's co-owner, citing two cases, Nillson
v. Law-rence 58 and Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National
Enameling & S. Co.,59 both of which hold only that a co-owner,
in the absence of a modifying contract, may license without
his co-tenant's permission. Further, the court stated, the ac-
counting would depend on whether or not the motion picture
company utilized the dramatization, inasmuch as the plaintiff
had no right in the novel. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal
as against the licensee. It was affirmed on the ground that
the motion picture rights were in the defendant novelist.
With reference to the accounting problem, the circuit
court stated: "As Beach has not appealed, we do not wish
to be understood as holding that the complaint states a cause
of equity against him." 10
In Brown v. Republic Productions,6 the lower court
granted an accounting against the co-owners and dismissed
the case against the licensee, a motion picture company. The
plaintiff appealed the adverse decision as to the licensee's
liability, and it was affirmed. In a dictum the appellate court
acknowledged the right to an accounting,62 citing Herbert v.
Fields,63 which has neither holding nor dictum in accord
therewith, holding only that a co-owner can license and that
the making of a motion picture is not a destructive use of
the copyright. This case is similar to Klein v. Beach.
In Von Tilzer v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.6" without dis-
cussing the point, an accounting was granted to the co-owner
of a renewal right, his co-tenant having been held a con-
structive trustee of the renewal for him. This case involved
a situation similar to that in Edward B. Marks Music Corp.
v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., where the circuit court specifically
reserved the question,65 and is akin to the Maurel case, supra,
58 148 App. Div. 678, 133 N. Y. Supp. 293 (lst Dep't 1912).
59 108 Fed. 77 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901) (patent).60239 Fed. at 110.
6-1 156 P. (2d) 40, 156 P. (2d) 42 (Cal. App. 1945).
62 156 P. (2d) at 41.
63 152 N. Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co. 1915).
64 53 F. Supp. 191 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
65 See note 46 supra.
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in the circumstance of the co-owner being without a legal
title.66
The case of Crosney v. Edward Small Productions 67
came up on a motion to dismiss, and the facts, although am-
biguous, were admitted for that purpose. The defendant
motion picture company through a trustee in bankruptcy
and by mesne conveyances acquired a one-half interest in the
motion picture and other rights in and to a certain play,
subject to plaintiff's share in those same rights of one-half
of its 50 % interest but only in the United States and Canada.
The defendant itself produced a movie. Held: Defendant is
a co-owner, not a licensee,6 8 who destroyed the subject matter
by making a motion picture, and therefore the plaintiff is
entitled to an accounting, citing illsan v. Lawrence, supra,
which is not authoritative for the proposition. That such use
does not amount to a destruction has been considered supra.
The Court does not take into consideration the defendant's
investment and risk in the making of the motion picture. It
is submitted that the decision in this case is not well reasoned.
It is difficult to view the matter in its proper perspective.
We allow a co-owner to use or license someone else to use
the whole of a right and all of its parts, when he owns only
an undivided portion and could sell or assign only that share.
It must be remembered, however, that the right is mutual.6 9
It would seem reasonable that as long as the co-owners
have an equal opportunity to dispose of the rights involved
and in the absence of special circumstances such as unfair
dealing,70 that they be allowed to retain their own income
66 Cf. Minion v. Warner, where it was said, ". . . as between tenants in
common who hold their estate through descent or under a will there is a quasi
trust relationship." 238 N. Y. 413, 417, 144 N. E. 665, 666 (1924) (realty).
The renewal right in a copyright might be classified in this category.
67 52 F. Supp. 559 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
68 Query, his rights being limited geographically, to the United States and
Canada, was he an assignee? See note 26 supra.
69 It has been suggested that inasmuch as it is preferable a licensee be free
of all claims, good policy might require the licensor to account to his co-owner.
See Pusey & Jones Co. v. Miller, 61 Fed. 401, 404 (C. C. D. Del. 1894)
(patent).
70 Compare Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Armstrong, 263 N. Y. 79, 188 N. E.
163 (1933); Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N. Y. 7, 143 N. E. 773 (1924).
Where a suit is started by all the co-owners against an infringer, and one
accepts a settlement, the right of the other co-owners to recover is not destroyed.
Lalance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 93 Fed. 197 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1899); see De Witt v. Elmira Nobles Mfg. Co., 66 N. Y. 459, 462
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and profits.7 1 If the co-owners would have it otherwise, they
can do so by contract.72
The alternative view means that by becoming an assig-
nee, and therefore a co-owner, you subject yourself to the
requirement of accounting of profits,73 although you may in-
vest your own capital and risk losses, while if you become
a licensee you can avoid this responsibility.74 The law should
not place a premium on subterfuge.
JURISDICTION AND NECESSARY PARTIES
This section contains some thoughts on the problems of
where to sue and who can sue to protect the rights of a
co-owner.
The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 75 over
cases involving statutory copyright 7 and an infringement
suit based on a statutory copyright could not be maintained
in a state court. 77  However, when the suit is for breach of a
fiduciary relationship,'8 or breach of contract,7 9 it may also
be brought in the state court, and where the suit is against
a co-owner for breach of contract as to the use of the joint
(1876); WALKER, Op. cit. supra note 46, at § 364. The co-owner is entitled,
in addition, to an accounting from his co-tenant. Lalance & Grosjean Mfg.
Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 107 Fed. 487 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1901).
7"Under the English rule, supra, you do not have the problem of account-
ing to a co-owner as discussed herein, for infringement suits against co-owners
are permissible, and the accounting can be obtained in such a suit. See 7
HALSBURY, op. cit. supra note 38, at § 917; COPINGER, op. cit. supra note 38,
at 159.
72 See note 36 supra.
73 See note 67 supra.
We are not dealing with a partnership situation here for mere co-tenancy
is insufficient to raise a presumption of partnership. See Note (1944) 150
A. L. R. 1003, 1004.
74 See note 61 supra.
7536 STAT. 1160 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §371 (1940). The Federal District
Courts have original jurisdiction by virtue of 36 STAT. 1092 (1911), 28 U. S.
C. §41(7) (1940); 35 STAT. 1078 (1909), 17 U. S. C. §34 (1940).
76 For published works, statutory copyright is secured if the proper copy-
right notice is affixed. See note 18 supra. For unpublished works, there is a
special provision for registration to attain statutory copyright. 37 STAT. 488
(1912) 17 U. S. C. § 11 (1940).
77 Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, 146 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944);
Loew's, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. (2d) 419, 115 P. (2d) 983 (1941);
Cohan v. Robbins Music Corp., 244 App. Div. 697, 280 N. Y. Supp. 571 (1st
Dep't 1935).
78 Underhill v. Schenck, 238 N. Y. 7, 143 N. E. 773 (1924).
79 Condon v. Associated Hospital Service, 287 N. Y. 411, 40 N. E. (2d)
230 (1942).
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copyright, the federal court has no jurisdiction unless the
proper allegations of diversity of citizenship and amount can
be made. 0
In the past it has been held that suit under the Copy-
right Stqtute must be in the name of the copyright propri-
etor 8 ' and the proprietor must be a party. 2  The present
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 3 require that all actions
be "... prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest;
• 84 A licensee is not such a party, 5 but a person with
an equitable title, including an equitable co-owner, would
seem to be, s1 and suit in his name would probably be suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirements of the Copyright Act, pro-
vided the owner of the legal interest were joined.
Where one co-owner brings a suit for infringement
against a stranger, the question is whether his co-tenant is
an indispensable party.87 It may happen that the co-tenant
so Meredith v. Smith, 145 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); cf. Wade v.
Lawder, 165 U. S. 623 (1897) (patent). But cf. Wooster v. Crane, 147 Fed.
515 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906). Inasmuch as an infringement suit cannot be brought
against a co-owner, note 34 supra, there is no choice between a cause of action
ex contractu or one for infringement as there would be against your own
licensee. E.g., against a licensee, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distributing Corp.
v. Bijou Theatre Co., 59 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).81 Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howell Sales Co., 287 Fed. 100 (C. C. A. 2d,
1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 755 (1923); Stephens v. Howell Sales Co., 16
F. (2d) 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v.
Radio Corp., 269 U. S. 459 (1926) (patent) 1 see Waterman v. Mackenzie,
138 U. S. 252, 255 (1891) (patent).
8 2 Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howell Sales Co., 282 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 2d,
1922), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 755 (1923); Independent Wireless Telegraph
Co. v. Radio Corp., 269 U. S. 459 (1926) (patent); Local Trademarks v.
Powers, 56 F. Supp. 751 (E. D. Pa. 1944); Society of European Stage Authors
and Composers, Inc. v. WCAU Broadcasting Co., 1 F. R. D. 264 (E. D. Pa.
1940); Stephens v. Howell Sales Co., 16 F. (2d) 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1926);
see Widenski v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 147 F. (2d) 909, 910 (C. C. A. 1st,
1945); Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, 51 F. Supp. 778, 779; same, 51 F. Supp. 779,
780, 781 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
83 Rule 81(a) provides that the Federal Rules become applicable to copy-
right cases if made so by Supreme Court rule. In accordance with § 25 of
fhe Copyright Law, 35 STAT. 1075 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 25 (1940) the Supreme
Court amended Rule 1 of the Copyright Rules of Practice to provide that the
Federal Rules should apply. Society of European Stage Authors and Com-
posers v. WCAU Broadcasting Co., 1 F. R. D. 264 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
84 FE '. RuLEs Civ. PRoc._Rule 17(a). Old Equity Rule 37 was similarly
worded. 28 U. S. C. § 723 (App.).
85 See note 81 supra; HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW (1942) 144.
B5 See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.
(2d) 268, 269 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Hoffman v. Santly-Joy, 51 F. Supp. 778,
779; same, 51 F. Supp. 779, 781 (S. D. N. Y. 1943).
87 FED. RULES CIV. PRoc., Rule 19(b).
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is unknown or unavailable. This may be a frequent occur-
rence in the renewal co-ownership cases, for the renewal
does not begin until the twenty-ninth year after the original
publication of the work.
If the co-tenants cannot be served in order to make them
parties, the non-joinder is not fatal.
These parties are not indispensable within Rule 19(b) ; because
their rights can be reserved in the judgment; the action can be finally
decided as to the plaintiff without them, if they cannot be served.
On this record we cannot say whether they can be served or not,
because we do not know who or where they are. But, even assuming
that it rests upon the plantiff to show that they cannot be served, the
objection is nevertheless not good, because the defendant was obliged
to take it by motion or by answer (Rule 12(h) ), which it did not do.8s
The plaintiff can receive his proportionate share of the
statutory damages or profits, and, in lieu of statutory dam-
ages, his actual damages s9
It is submitted that allowing a proceeding to continue
in the absence of a co-tenant as a party would seem to be
in consonance with the thesis that the co-owners are indepen-
dent of each other and not entitled to an accounting inter se.
Strangely enough the patent cases have used the thesis to
deny independent recovery, going so far in the argument that
the co-owners are "at the mercy of each other" as to find the
problem of non-joinder a substantive question rather than a
procedural one, thereby denying the co-owner the possibility
of bringing a recalcitrant co-tenant into court as a party
defendant under Rule 19 (a).110
THEODORE R. KUPFERMAN.
8 8 Edward 13. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d)
268 at 269-270 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944). Accord, Stuff v. La Budde Feed & Grain
Co., 42 F. Supp. 493 (E. D. Wis. 1941); Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D.
686 (1879) ; see Lauri v. Renad, [1892] 3 Chan. 402, 413 (C. A.). Contra:
Nillson v. Lawrence, 148 App. Div. 678, 133 N. Y. Supp. 293 (1st Dep't 1912).
89 Edward B. Marks Music Corp. V. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. (2d)
268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (1879).
90 Gibbs v. Emerson Electric Mfg. Co., 29 F. Supp. 810 (W. D. Mo.
1939); Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co., 20 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md.
1937) ; see WALKER, PATENTS (Dellar's ed. 1937) § 364 (Supp. 1944).
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